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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS FOR THE FTC
IN MERGER CASES
FTC v. Dean Foods Co.*
A major problem in enforcing the antitrust laws in merger cases has been
the difficulty of giving appropriate and effective relief to the Government at
the close of litigation. Since enormous quantities of evidence must be considered
before reaching a judgment as to the merger's probable effects, prosecutions by
the Department of Justice often last two or three years,' with Federal Trade
Commission proceedings taking even longer.2 By the time illegality is estab-
lished, the merger often is a fait accompli, making restoration of competition
virtually impossible. Furthermore, should an order to divest acquired assets
issue, curious results may follow, as in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,4 where
the only buyer to be found for the acquired assets was another large com-
petitor.5 A solution in some situations is a preliminary injunction either block-
ing the merger or requiring that assets be kept separate during the course of
litigation. The former tends to be a permanent obstacle to the contemplated
transaction, since market fluidity severely reduces the ability of the parties
to remain in their bargaining positions for any length of time; the result in
many cases is that the government is able to get final relief without trial.6 The
latter type of injunction, however, has been utilized increasingly in recent
prosecutions by the Justice Department7 and private parties8 despite the pos-
sibility of the Brown Shoe type of situation, for it permits the parties to execute
their agreement before the market changes.
Proposed Legislation
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 9 probably the most important antitrust tool
presently in use, is enforced concurrently by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the Justice Department,'0 the former proceeding by administra-
* 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
1 Note, 'Treliminary Relief for the Government Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,"
79 Harv. L. Rev. 391 (1965).
2 E.g., A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962) (six years); Pillsbury
Mills, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1274 (1960) (eight years).
3 See United States v. Continental Can Co., CCH 1964 Trade Cas. 80,138-39 (S.D.N.Y.);
Farm journal, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 26, 50-51 (1956). See generally "Divestiture Problems in
Merger Cases," BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 196, pp. B-1, B-2 (1965); Zimmer-
man, "The Federal Trade Commission and Mergers," 64 Colum. L. Rev. 500, 519-22 (1964).
4 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
5 "Divestiture Problems in Merger Cases," supra note 3, at B-2. Similar situations arose in
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); Crown Zellerbach Corp., 54
F.T.C. 798, aff'd, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961).
6 In three recent cases, for example, mergers were abandoned when preliminary injunc-
tions issued. United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651 (D.NJ. 1964); United States
v. Allied Chemical Corp., CCH 1964 Trade Cas. 79,756 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
7 E.g., United States v. Brown Shoe Co., CCH 1956 Trade Cas. 71,109, 71,117 (E.D. Mo.).
8 E.g., Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.), aff'd,
206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
9 As amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964) provides in part:
[N]o corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall
acquire . . . the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where . . .
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.10 Clayton Act §§ 11, 15, 38 Stat. 734, 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 21, 25 (1964).
1967] NOTES
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
tive, the latter by judicial, action. The Commission is empowered, after hearing,
to issue self-enforcing divestiture orders," reviewable in the federal courts of
appeals.12 Whereas the Clayton Act specifically provides procedures by which
the justice Department 13 or a private party 4 may seek a preliminary injunc-
tion, no such express authorization exists for the FTC. The Commission ap-
parently has never attempted to get an injunction in the district courts, and
past attempts in the courts of appeals have been unsuccessful, with one court
denying the authority of the Commission to seek such relief.15 Although the
Commission repeatedly has requested legislation empowering it to seek injunc-
tions in the district courts or, more recently, to issue such orders itself,' 6
Congress has not acted.17
The desirability of this power for the FTC has been the subject of con-
siderable debate.' 8 Opponents contend that since FTC hearings are nearly
always more protracted than actions in the district courts,' 9 the danger of
effectively preventing a merger without a full hearing would be much greater
than it is already. They also argue that the overlapping jurisdiction of the
FTC and the Justice Department is sufficiently confusing without eliminating
the only existing practical basis for a division of -labor and without increasing
the possibility of competition for the most newsworthy cases,20 and that the
court issuing the injunction would have difficulty following the lengthy course
of an FTC hearing in order to keep the provisions of its order up to date.
Finally, it is urged that the unbiased and objective role required of an ad-
judicatory agency 2 ' would be compromised by a grant of power to seek in-
junctions. The FTC has been long criticized for its combined role of judge and
prosecutor,22 and the confusion of the two could be intensified if the Com-
11 Prior to 1959 the FTC had to seek enforcement in the courts of appeals. Clayton Act
§ 11, 38 Stat. 735 (1914), amended by 73 Stat. 244 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 21(g) (1964). Sec-
tion 7 was virtually a dead letter prior to the Celler-Kefauver Amendment of 1950, which
made clear that certain asset as well as stock acquisitions are prohibited. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950),
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
12 Clayton Act § 11(c), 73 Stat. 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964).
'3 Clayton Act § 15, 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964).
14 Clayton Act § 16, 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).
'5 FTC v. International Paper Co., 241 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1956). An injunction was denied
without opinion in FTC v. Farm journal, Inc., FTC Docket No. 6388 (unreported); see
Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the judiciary, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 15, at 29 (1956) (statement of FTC Chairman Gwynne). But cf. Board
of Governors v. Transamerica Corp., 184 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 883
(1950).
16 E.g., H.R. 9424, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
17 The 1956 bill was passed by the House and reported favorably out of committee in the
Senate, but never acted on there. See 102 Cong. Rec. 6380, S. Rep. No. 2817, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1956). No subsequent bill has come as close to passage.
18 See Hearings on H.R. 6478, Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 15 (1956); Hearings Before the Antitrust Sub-
committee of the House Committee on the judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 5, at 1
(1961).
19 See notes 1 and 2 supra and accompanying text.
20 See Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the
judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2, at 65 (1957) (Congressman Keating expressing fear
that "the prize will be to the swift").
21 Cf. Administrative Procedure Act § 5(c), 60 Stat. 240 (1946); 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c)
(1964).
22 See FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929) (rejecting a challenge to the Clayton Act on
the ground that it combines in the FTC the roles of complainant, prosecutor, and judge).
See also Hearings, supra note 20, at 296 (letter from National Association of Manufacturers).
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mission is permitted to go to court as an advocate on one side of a dispute
which it must then adjudicate impartially.23
Proponents of FTC injunctive power argue that the theoretical advantages
of the FTC proceeding are consistency and expertise, and that experience has
shown the district courts, any one of which only rarely hears a section 7 case,
to be uneven in their application of the antitrust laws.24 While the Commission
has been criticized for failing to develop consistent doctrine and to provide
expert and sophisticated treatment of antitrust problems,25 this failure may
be due in part to its inability to issue effective orders.26 Furthermore, in the
existing situation, the ultimate success of a proposed anticompetitive merger
may depend on whether it is investigated by the Justice Department, which can
obtain a preliminary injunction, or the Federal Trade Commission, which can-
not. Consistency in enforcement, as well as full use of the advantages of the
FTC, would therefore seem to be enhanced by giving the FTC remedial tools
comparable to those of the justice Department.
The case for an FTC injunctive power seems persuasive. The objection based
on possible confusion of adjudicating and prosecuting functions is largely
academic, since other agencies, and the FTC itself,27 seek preliminary injunc-
tions in many cases which they later must adjudicate, and this procedure
apparently is successful. The problem of the lack of an adequate basis for a
division of labor between the Justice Department and the FTC could, if neces-
sary, be obviated by a statutory provision. Finally, the contention that the FTC
operates too slowly to make preliminary injunctions fair to respondents is coun-
tered by the argument that injunctions of limited duration might speed up FTC
proceedings.2 8 Nevertheless, the fact remains that Congress has not seen fit to
act on FTC proposals for an injunctive power.
A Judicial Solution-The Dean Foods Case
When the Commission learned of a proposed merger between Dean Foods
Co. and Bowman Dairy Co., two of the largest packaged milk distributors in
the Chicago area, it advised them unofficially, and at their request, that it
believed the merger illegal. When the agreement nevertheless was signed, the
Commission issued a complaint under Section 7 of the Clayton Act 29 and
23 See FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 618 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
24 Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 504.
25 See ibid.; Simon, "The Case Against the Federal Trade Commission," 19 U. Chi. L. Rev.
297 (1952).
26 See Farm Journal, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 26, 50-51 (1956).
27 The FTC may seek preliminary injunctions in the district courts in certain specified
situations. Federal Trade Commission Act § 13(a), 52 Stat. 115 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 53a
(1964) (to restrain false advertising of foods, drugs, or cosmetics); Wool Products Labeling
Act § 7(b), 54 Stat. 1132 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 68e(b) (1964) (to restrain false labeling or
importation without appropriate labeling) ; Fur Products Labeling Act § 9(b), 65 Stat. 180
(1951), 15 U.S.C. § 69g(b) (1964); Textile Fiber Products Identification Act § 8, 72 Stat.
1721 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 70f (1964); Flammable Fabrics Act § 6(a), 67 Stat. 113 (1953),
15 U.S.C. § 1195(a) (1964) (to restrain the manufacture, offering for sale, or sale of wearing
apparel of the proscribed degree of flammability); Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 302, 52
Stat. 1043 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 332 (1964).
28 In Dean Foods Co., FTC Docket No. 8674, the court of appeals injunction was limited
to a four-month period. Four months later, the Commission reversed the trial examiner's
order dismissing the complaint, the entire course of the proceedings taking less than a year.
3 Trade Reg. Rep. f[1I 17,628, 17,682, 17,765 (1966).
29 See note 9 supra.
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Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.30 The agreement provided
that Dean Foods would take over Bowman's routes and processing plant and
that the latter would distribute the rest of its assets to its stockholders. Be-
cause of the resulting complete integration of Bowman's operation into Dean's
and extinction of the former, divestiture could never reestablish the status quo.
Therefore, the FTC sought a preliminary injunction in the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals under the All Writs Act.3 ' A temporary restraining order was
granted, but on hearing the order was dissolved and the injunction denied for
lack of jurisdiction.32 Mr. Justice Clark, however, on application of the Solicitor
General issued a preliminary injunction restraining respondents from making
substantial changes in Bowman's structure or assets. On certiorari, the Supreme
Court, four justices dissenting, reversed the court of appeals and remanded for
a hearing on the merits of the petition for the writ.3 3 The majority reasoned
that, if Dean Foods went ahead with its plans to acquire all of Bowman's
fixed assets and goodwill and if Bowman distributed cash and securities, it
would be impossible to restore Bowman after a finding that the merger was
illegal. The FTC would be unable to provide a meaningful order, and the court
of appeals would, in effect, be deprived of its jurisdiction to review a possible
future appeal by the respondents. The result of the Supreme Court's decision
is that the FTC henceforth will have the power denied it by Congress.
The All Writs Act-Legislative Authorization for the Issuance of Preliminary
Injunctions
The All Writs Act, on which the Court relied in Dean Foods, authorizes
the federal courts to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 34
The Act is derived from provisions contained in the Judiciary Act of 1789.35
It does not create powers in the courts, but "mak[es] ...explicit the right
to exercise powers implied from the creation of such courts." 36 The usual writs
formed by appelate courts with express reference to it have been mandamus,
certiorari, and prohibition "to confine inferior courts to the exercise of their
prescribed jurisdiction or to compel them to exercise their authority when
it is their duty to do so."37 Almost every grant of a writ in aid of appellate
jurisdiction has been in response to a jurisdictional error below that would
make important questions unreviewable or moot.38 The writ of injunction, when
30 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
31 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964).
32 FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 356 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
33 FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966). An injunction of four months duration
was granted by the court of appeals on remand. Two months later the FTC trial examiner
dismissed the complaint under the "failing company" doctrine. The Commission reversed
just before the injunction expired. 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 1111 17,682, 17,765 (1966).
34 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1964).
35 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81, provides in pertinent part:
That all the . . . courts of the United States, shall have power to issue . . .all other
writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of
their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law.
36 Reviser's Notes to Judicial Code of 1948 § 1651, U.S.C. Cong. Service, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1867 (1948).
37 United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 202 (1945).
38 See id. (certiorari to review preliminary injunction against defendants where district
court patently had not jurisdiction) ; DeBeers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S.
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issued, has usually had the same general purpose as a stay of execution, that
is, to preserve the status quo pending appeal,3 9 and, like most section 1651
writs, it is used primarily in cases where the issue to be appealed otherwise
would be mooted 40 Such preliminary orders may issue even where the question
to be decided is whether the court has jurisdiction to enjoin the defendant.4 '
The preliminary injunction issued by Mr. Justice Clark in the present case
is typical of this conventional, implicit use of the All-Writs power, as is the
temporary restraining order issued by the Seventh Circuit.
Whether the writ actually will be granted is termed a matter of "discretion,"
since the "power," theoretically, is unlimited.4 2 This discretion may be exer-
cised before an appeal has been taken, and even before the lower court has
issued an appealable order.43 Nevertheless, previous decisions of the Supreme
Court had indicated that, where the orders of an administrative agency are
reviewable in a court of appeals, the "appellate jurisdiction" of the court of
appeals for the purpose of section 1651 does not attach at least until a final
order has been issued by the agency. In Matter of NLRB 44 the Court held
that, since the court of appeals is "without jurisdiction to take action at the
behest of the Board until the transcript shall have been filed," it has "no
power . . . [to restrain the Board at the request of the respondents] prior to
such plenary submission of the cause."' 45 In Federal Power Comm'n v. Metro-
politan Edison Co.46 the court of appeals had enjoined the Commission from
conducting an investigation until a hearing was held on respondent's petition
challenging the agency's jurisdiction to conduct the investigation. The Supreme
Court held that the court of appeals "had no appellate jurisdiction to protect"47
until the agency issued a reviewable order. One court of appeals did issue a
writ on the application of an agency before its final decision, but the case
turned on a rather exceptional situation. In Board of Governors v. Transamer-
212 (1945) (same); Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932) (mandamus to compel
district court to issue bench warrant which it had no discretion to refuse); McClellan v.
Carland, 217 U.S. 268 (1910) (mandamus by court of appeals requiring circuit court to
determine pending action where respondent improperly had been granted a stay until finaljudgment in related state court action).
39 E.g., In re Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 72 Sup. Ct. 1086 (1946) (Reed, J., in cham-
bers). See generally Robertson & Kirkham, jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United
States §§ 438-39 (Wolfson & Kurland ed. 1951). Appellate courts also may issue section 1651
injunctions to prevent interference with the status quo of cases already before them. Toledo
Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923); see Whitney National Bank v. Bank
of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411, 425 (1965) (dictum).
40 See, e.g., Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964), 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1539 (1964). District
courts often use writs "in aid of jurisdiction" to preserve questions pending trial. See Fisk v.
Union Pac. R.R., 9 Fed. Cas. 167 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873) (defendant corporation properly
enjoined from dissolving itself in order to defeat court's jurisdiction).
41 Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658, 662, n.4 (1963); cf. Ex parte Republic
of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). For district court injunctions pending decision of jurisdictional
questions, see United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); United States v.
Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906).
42 LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 255 (1957).
43 Roche v. Evaporated AM Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 25 (1943).
44 304 U.S. 486 (1938).
45 Id. at 493-94.
46 304 U.S. 375 (1938).
47 Id. at 383.
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ica Corp.48 the Federal Reserve Board had no power to order asset divestiture
and actually would have lost jurisdiction upon asset acquisition,49 so that per-
mitting the merger to be completed pendente lite would have barred absolutely
any future review. Since the Celler-Kefauver Amendment50 no similar case has
arisen, and one court expressly has repudiated Transamerica."
Dean Foods apparently rejects the assumption of most of these cases that
courts may not intervene in an administrative case without express statutory
authorization, and it does so in a peculiarly inapt situation. First, it is difficult
to say that the Seventh Circuit was protecting its "appellate jurisdiction" when
quite possibly it might never have acquired jurisdiction even if respondents
appealed. A person against whom an order is entered may appeal in "any cir-
cuit within which such violation occurred or within which such person resides
or carries on business.152 As Mr. Justice Fortas points out in his dissenting
opinion, a final order in this case could be reviewed in either the Sixth or
Eighth Circuit, where both respondents do business.5 3 Such an anomaly would
not exist, had Congress intentionally and specifically provided a procedure for
preliminary injunctions in these cases. This, however, is one hazard of applying
too broadly, as the Court seems to have done, Professor Jaffe's thesis that the
statutory provisions should be "projected against the institutional framework
of agencies and courts." 54 Second, the decision permits an injunction in aid
of appellate jurisdiction at the application of a party which by statute is pre-
cluded from appealing; logically, the agency would have no standing to invoke
the court's appellate jurisdiction at the outset, since it cannot do so later. The
possibility of this anomaly may have been a tacit reason for the generally ac-
cepted view that the All-Writs power could not be exercised in these circum-
stances.5 5 In reality, the jurisdiction being protected by this decision is that
of the FTC, not the court of appeals. In effect, therefore, the Court is giving
the agency itself the injunctive power.
The Clayton Act-Legislative Authorization for the Commission To Seek
Preliminary Injunctions
Professor Jaffe's thesis is not the traditional view. Reference by the Court
to the FTC's "inherent standing as a suitor" is unprecedented. The traditional
theory is that administrative agencies are creations of the legislature with
circumscribed powers, limited to those activities authorized by statute,50 and
48 184 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 883 (1950).
49 The Supreme Court, in Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587, 594
(1934), had held that under the old § 7 the enforcing agency had no jurisdiction to proceed
against a merger once assets were acquired. See note 10, supra.
50 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). This amendment empowered the agencies
enforcing § 7 to order asset divestiture.
51 FTC v. International Paper Co., 241 F.2d 372, 374 (2d Cir. 1956), 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
1297 (1957).
52 Clayton Act § 11(c), 73 Stat. 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 21(c) (1964).
53 FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 624, n.12 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
54 Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 681 (1965).
55 See, e.g., Kronstein, Miller & Dommer, Major American Antitrust Laws 289-90 (1965);
"Divestiture Problems in Merger Cases," BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 196, p. B-1
(1965); "Restraining Orders and Preliminary Injunctions Against Mergers," BNA Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. No. 180, p. B-1 (1964); Notes, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 391 (1965), 40 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 771 (1965). But see Note, 46 Geo. L.J. 190 (1957).
56 Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309 (1944).
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that no powers can be implied except those absolutely necessary to give effect
to the statute.57 Although this rule has often been interpreted rather broadly
by the Court,58 no authority suggests that the Clayton Act provides the FTC
with the ability to seek preliminary injunctions against section 7 violations.
In contrast, express provision has been made for such a procedure in actions
brought by the Justice Department or aggrieved private parties.5 9 Further-
more, the FTC is specifically authorized to seek an injunction in certain other
types of cases.5 0 The exclusion of any express authorization under the Clayton
Act and its inclusion in other statutes relating to the FTC suggests that Con-
gress meant to withhold this power. 1 This is confirmed by the Clayton Act
provision that FTC cases requiring preliminary injunction can be prosecuted
by the Attorney General and expedited in the district courts. 2 Although it
involves some duplication of effort, this procedure is apparently workable. 63
Thus, neither congressional intent nor compelling need seems to justify read-
ing such authority into the act. Nevertheless, the Court finds a broad con-
gressional purpose to entrust the FTC with Clayton Act enforcement and to
give it adequate power to provide effective remedies for violations: "It would
stultify congressional purpose to say that the Commission did not have the
incidental povwer to ask the courts of appeals to exercise their authority derived
from the All Writs Act." 4 This statement begs the question, but it is con-
sistent with the recent trend of the Court toward strengthening the merger
provisions of the antitrust laws 5 and construing broadly the enforcement pro-
visions of the Federal Trade Commission Act.65
Effect of the Dean Foods Decision
When the Justice Department or a private party asks for a preliminary in-
junction, the district courts have required showings of reasonable probability
of government success on the merits67 and probable difficulty of divestiture
after trial,6 8 although no very clear standards for granting the injunction have
57 In FTC v. Radalam Co., 283 U.S. 643, at 649 (1931), the Court said:
Official powers cannot be extended beyond the terms and necessary implications of the
grant. If broader powers be desirable, they must be conferred by Congress. They
cannot . . . be created by the courts in the proper exercise of their judicial functions.
58 See Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 367-68 (1965).
59 Clayton Act §§ 15, 16, 38 Stat. 736, 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 25, 26 (1964).
60 See note 27, supra.
61 See FTC v. International Paper Co., 241 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir. 1956).
62 Clayton Act § 11(b), 64 Stat. 1127 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1964).
63 At the Hearings, supra note 20, at 65, Attorney General Brownell testified:
Under the present law, of course, we work it out that if a preliminary injunction
seems to be required, whether the matter first comes to the attention of the FTC or
ourselves, we cooperate with them and bring the necessary action so that it is not as
though the situation were critical or anything of that sort ....
64 FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 606. [Emphasis added.]
65 See Day, "Conglomerate Mergers and 'The Curse of Bigness,'" 42 N.C.L. Rev. 511(1964); Rahl, "Current Antitrust Developments in the Merger Field," 8 Antitrust Bull. 493,
507 (1963). On the Court's history of holding for the Government in recent cases, see Com-
ment, "Clayton Section 7: A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court's Antitrust-Anti-Bigness
Complex in Merger Litigation Since the Brown Shoe Case," 11 Wayne L. Rev. 739, 743
(1965).
66 See Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 367-68 (1965).
67 United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651 (D.NJ. 1964).




been developed. 69 Evidence is presented showing the share of the market
occupied by the merging parties, the extent of concentration in the industry,
the probable effect of the merger on competition, and the like.70 Because the
effect of a preliminary injunction usually is abandonment of merger plans, 71
parties have a natural tendency to present all possible evidence. Thus the
hearings often last several days.7 2
In fairness, parties sought to be enjoined in the courts of appeals under
the Dean Foods decision should be entitled to require the FTC to make at
least as much showing as the Justice Department. Unlike an injunction granted
on application of the Justice Department,7 3 one granted under the All Writs
Act is for a very narrow purpose. Nevertheless, logic indicates that the FTC
should have to show (1) probable future appellate jurisdiction in the court
of appeals, i.e., probability that the FTC will issue a restraining order, and (2)
probable "defeat" of jurisdiction in the absence of a preliminary injunction,
i.e., probability that respondents will merge to such an extent that an FTC
divestiture order would be ineffectual, and appellate review meaningless. 74
Although differently derived, these standards are of the same type as those
imposed on the Justice Department.75
The courts of appeals, to decide these questions fairly, will have to take
testimony, receive evidence, and make findings of fact in order to issue the
detailed and individualized orders which are most desirable for antimerger in-
junctions. Such tasks ordinarily are assigned to the district courts, not the
courts of appeals. 76 Given the willingness of the Supreme Court to permit the
FTC to seek an injunction, the possibility should not be ignored that the
latter might, on a somewhat related theory, be able to do so in the district
courts where logically such procedures belong. The district courts are said to
be possessed of inherent equitable powers to enforce rights among parties over
which they can obtain personal jurisdiction.y7 Such powers have been used
to protect the jurisdiction of other tribunals, notably state courts. 78 To allow
the FTC to seek antimerger injunctions in district courts in order to protect
its own jurisdiction seems at least as logical as the procedure endorsed by the
present case. Certainly such a procedure would be much more practical,
whether judicially or legislatively established.
This alternative procedure becomes even more attractive when one notes that
69 See Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 391, 398-401 (1964).
70 See United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., supra note 68.
71 See cases cited in note 6 supra and accompanying text.
72 United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., supra note 68, took five full days. See also United
States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1963) (injunction denied after
lengthy hearing).
73 The court may issue "such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be
deemed just under the circumstances." Clayton Act § 15, 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25
(1964).
74 Paradoxically, the effect of Dean Foods may be to deprive the courts of appeals of a
chance to review, since an injunction often results in abandonment of merger plans.
75 Perhaps these standards are stricter. The justice Department need not make even that
showing required for ordinary preliminary injunctions. See United States v. Brown Shoe
Co., CCH 1956 Trade Cas. 71,109, 71,114 (E.D. Mo.).
76 On the role of the appellate court, see the dissenting opinion of Fortas, J., in FTC v.
Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, at 630-31 (1966).
77 Jaffe, supra note 54, at 657.
78 See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 207 Fed. 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1913).
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the Dean Foods decision potentially affects much more than FTC practice.
Decisions of most administrative agencies are at least theoretically reviewable
in the courts of appeals. 79 Unless modified, this case could be used to support
an attempt by any agency not otherwise equipped with such authority to seek
preliminary injunctions from a court which may review its final orders. The
SEC, for instance, might seek a preliminary order restraining sale of a new
stock issue on the strength of the possibility that the court might later have
reason to review a Commission stop order, which might otherwise come too
late to prevent the issue.80 Since Dean Foods rests on a practical rather than
a technical loss of potential jurisdiction, this procedure might be used where-
ever the agency considers inadequate the remedial powers granted it by the
legislature.
CONCLUSION
The apparent inability of the Federal Trade Commission to procure pre-
liminary injunctions restraining mergers against which it had filed complaints
was a defect in its power to enforce Section 7 of the Clayton Act. While con-
siderable objection from the business community to an injunction procedure
exists, it probably is necessary for effective and consistent enforcement of
section 7. The Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Dean Foods Co.81 permits
the courts of appeals to issue such injunctions under the All Writs Act upon
application of the FTC, on the theory that an injunction will protect the juris-
diction of the appellate court, which may later be called on to review the FTC
order. While out of line with procedural precedents and legislative history, the
decision is consistent with the Court's favorable attitude toward strengthened
antitrust enforcement.
Although FTC authority to seek preliminary injunctions in merger cases may
be desirable, the Dean Foods decision may have unfortunate results. The
courts of appeals are not well-suited to the extensive fact-finding hearings
which are essential to the judicious use of preliminary injunctions against
mergers. Possibly, however, reasoning similar to the Court's could support the
more practical alternative of an FTC power to seek these injunctions in the
district courts. Furthermore, it is a bit unsettling to speculate on the possible
use of Dean Foods as a precedent for granting an injunction whenever any
administrative body's usual modes of relief are in some way inadequate. It may
be that the decision will stimulate Congress to enact legislation setting up
statutory procedures whereby the FTC or other agencies may obtain pre-
liminary injunctions in the district courts under clearly defined circumstances.
William C. Scott, Jr.*
79 Admintrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
80 A somewhat similar application was denied in the district court in SEC v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 148 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), judgment vacated as moot, 325 U.S. 833 (1945).
81 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
* Editorial Supervisor, Jonathan E. Gaines.
1967] NOTES
